Do Coups Move Migration to the OECD? Bounds from a Staggered Design

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Abstract

A coup can heighten incentives to leave, but moving to a rich democracy also takes money, legal access and a network. I ask whether successful coups raise migration to OECD countries. I combine the Powell–Thyne coup catalogue with OECD inflow records for 1995–2023, UNHCR asylum applications and the IAB Brain Drain Database, and compare 18 coup countries with 79 developing countries without one in staggered difference-in-differences event studies. The coups lower electoral democracy and income per capita. They do not significantly change recorded inflows to the OECD, asylum applications, skilled emigration or the spread of migrants across destinations.

Keywords

Coups d’État, Political Instability, International Migration, Asylum, Forced Migration, Difference-in-Differences

Citation

Chávez Padilla, Carlos César. 2026. “Do Coups Move Migration to the OECD? Bounds from a Staggered Design.” Working paper.