Do Coups Move Migration to the OECD? Bounds from a Staggered Design

Comparing 18 coup countries with 79 developing countries without one, coups lower electoral democracy and income per capita but do not significantly change recorded inflows to the OECD, asylum applications, skilled emigration or the spread of migrants across destinations.

October 2026 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Political Instability

A first-event local projection on the Bjørnskov–Rode panel of 180 countries (1960–2022) shows the impact-year TFP contraction is 4.2 percent for coups that displace a democracy and negligible otherwise. An option-value framework and a two-block structural estimation organize the asymmetry.

June 2024 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla