Do Voters Punish Political Instability? Attribution, Electoral Subversion, and Material Disruption in Peru

A district-level electoral panel for Peru tests whether voters punish an attributable electoral-subversion offensive and an authorless material shock. Both yield no differential punishment, and two-round coordination helps explain why subversion can go locally unpunished.

June 2026 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

The Limits of Tariff Coercion: When Does Economic Leverage Work?

42 views, 16 downloads. Examines conditions under which tariff threats effectively coerce policy changes in target countries.

February 2026 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

Fraud Allegations as Identification: A Within-Election Forensic Test Using Institutional Challenge Records

Standard election forensics cannot separate genuine polarization from manipulation. This paper uses the polling stations a losing candidate formally challenged as a treatment group, comparing their forensic properties to the unchallenged remainder of the same election — turning the fraud allegations themselves into the counterfactual.

February 2026 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

Electoral Pressure and Political Lying: A Theory of Political Lying

154 views, 31 downloads. Develops a game-theoretic model of when politicians lie under electoral pressure.

December 2024 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

A Simple Mathematical Model of Lying

Addresses strategic deception, political economy, misinformation, and political manipulation through a mathematical framework.

December 2024 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

Estimating The Effects Of Financial Liberalization On Governability And Social Stability

304 views, 46 downloads. Examines how financial liberalization affects political and social stability.

November 2024 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Political Instability

A first-event local projection on the Bjørnskov–Rode panel of 180 countries (1960–2022) shows the impact-year TFP contraction is 4.2 percent for coups that displace a democracy and negligible otherwise. An option-value framework and a two-block structural estimation organize the asymmetry.

June 2024 · Carlos César Chávez Padilla